| | |  | Training | Home » » Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam | | | | | | | Description: | | “Westmoreland is a great book, a classic by an author who knows his subject well and tells the story without hesitation.” — General Donn A. Starry, U.S. Army (ret.), Commander, Army Training and Doctrine Command (1977–1981)
Is it possible that the riddle of America’s military failure in Vietnam has a one-word, one-man answer?
Unless and until we understand General William Westmoreland, we will never understand what went wrong in Vietnam. An Eagle Scout at fifteen, First Captain of his West Point class, Westmoreland fought in two wars and became Superintendent at West Point. Then he was chosen to lead the war effort in Vietnam for four crucial years. He proved a disaster. He could not think creatively about unconventional warfare, chose an unavailing strategy, stuck to it in the face of all opposition, and stood accused of fudging the results when it mattered most. In this definitive portrait, Lewis Sorley makes a plausible case that the war could have been won were it not for Westmoreland. The tragedy of William Westmoreland carries lessons not just for Vietnam, but for the future of American leadership. Westmoreland is essential reading from a masterly historian. | | | Product Details: | | | Author:
| Lewis Sorley | | Hardcover:
| 416 pages | | Publisher:
| Houghton Mifflin Harcourt | | Publication Date:
| October 11, 2011 | | Language:
| English | | ISBN:
| 0547518269 | | Product Length:
| 9.31 inches | | Product Width:
| 6.32 inches | | Product Height:
| 1.3 inches | | Product Weight:
| 1.43 pounds | | Package Length:
| 9.1 inches | | Package Width:
| 6.1 inches | | Package Height:
| 1.1 inches | | Package Weight:
| 0.65 pounds | | Average Customer Rating:
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64 of 74 found the following review helpful:
 A Man Promoted Above his AbilitySep 12, 2011
By Hrafnkell Haraldsson
I grew up during the Vietnam War. I was seven years old when General William Westmoreland was sent to Vietnam by LBJ to take charge of things there. I was eleven when he lost his job and by then, had lost us the war. Vietnam was in the news the entire time, on TV, in the paper, in Time Magazine - as was Westmoreland's iconic chin. Being the son of military parents I'd early gotten the history bug and I was fascinated by what was taking place over in Southeast Asia, even if I didn't understand it well. As I grew older, and things over there grew worse, I began to wonder how we could possibly lose such a war (as I thought it was) against such a small country.
Lewis Sorely's "Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam" will tell you how. Sorely has the credentials for this book. He is himself a graduate of West Point. He served in Vietnam. He even served in the office of the Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, and taught at West Point. This isn't just a book by some journalist trying to get at the bottom of things. Sorely has been "at the bottom of things" and he has done the leg work over a period of years, talking to 175 people in his search for the events he here recounts.
Sorely makes a point of stating at the outset his premise: that we need to understand Westmoreland in order to understand what happened in Vietnam. And so he begins at the beginning, with Westmoreland's childhood and early experiences, his pre-war service in the field artillery at Fort Sill, then Hawaii, and finally with the 9th Infantry Division at Fort Bragg. He then follows the aggressive young officer through his WWII service in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe and important early connections he made with such important figures at General Maxwell, "who rose to far greater prominence," writes Sorely, "and became Westmoreland's principal mentor and patron."
After the war, Westmoreland shifted to Airborne duty and served under General James Gavin in the 82nd Airborne Division, first as regimental commander and then division chie of staff. Two years into the Korean War Westmoreland was made Commanding Officer of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and was promoted to brigadier general. Apparently, this was Westmoreland's niche. Worely writes that Westermoreland "would describe command of the 187th as 'the most satisfying experience of my military service.'" It was apparently also the position for which he was most qualified. After the war, he served briefly in the Pentagon before being given divisional command - the 101st Airborne Division.
From reading Worely's book, you could (and should) walk away with the conviction that had Westmoreland remained a divisional commander he would be differently remembered today. But he was made Superintendent of West Point, a posting for which he was manifestly unqualified, before being selected by LBJ from a list of four officers to take command of U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In the end, Maxwell Taylor, his old protege, got Westmoreland the job. One general tried to stop it. Brigadier General Amos "Joe" Jordan, who knew Westmoreland well and said it would be a "grave mistake" to appoint him. "He is spit and polish, two up and one back. This is a counterinsurgency war, and he would have no idea of how to deal with it."
And he didn't, but he got the job anyway.
Incredibly, nobody apparently had any idea how to deal with it. Worse, he met with General Douglas MacArthur, who gave some terrible advice that Westmoreland took to heart: treat the South Vietnamese officers you will be advising "as you did your cadets" (!) and "Do not overlook the possibility that in order to defeat the guerrilla you may have to resort to a scorched earth policy."
You can probably see where this is all going already. Westmoreland, writes Sorely, "Surprisingly, or perhaps not...did not meet with Lyndon Johnson before heading out to Vietnam."
I almost wept reading that. And you will likely feel like doing a lot of weeping as you read on. I won't try to recount Westmoreland's Vietnam service here. Suffice it to say that he comes out as a man entirely out of his depth, lacking imagination, unable to think outside the box - and remember, we're talking a counterinsurgency war here, not the Normandy beaches. You wonder how Westmoreland kept his job for so long as you read. And you begin to have your questions about how we could lose the war answered in ways you probably would not prefer.
Westmoreland seems by the end a sad and pathetic figure, but worse is the untold suffering caused in a war that was mismanaged from the very beginning. The blame falls squarely on General William C. Westmoreland. The American people were deceived; the Vietnamese people were betrayed, and both deserved better. But if Westmoreland was to blame, how much more to blame the U.S. government and military who perpetuated a system that allowed an utter incompetent to rise to high command and remain there long enough to lose a war.
"Westmoreland" is a sobering read, and a very good one. Highly recommended.
30 of 34 found the following review helpful:
 Excellent look at a wrong leader at the wrong timeSep 11, 2011
By Nathan Webster
This is an excellent, close look at one of the most failed Generals in the history of the US military. At least Benedict Arnold was defeated before he did much damage.
The tragedy of Westmoreland is best introduced by author Lewis Sorley in Westmoreland's role as First Captain of his 1936 West Point class. As the top student leader, he participated in the shunning - as in, nobody spoke to him on personal level for four years - of black classmate Benjamin O. Davis, later a Tuskeege Airman, and an Air Force general himself. Westmoreland excuses himself in decades-later letters to friends, explaining that it was "the times," and that Davis had to expect the treatment he got.
It's true, in 1936, Davis probably did expect it, and he got it. And it really wasn't up to 22-year-old Westmoreland to change race relations in the country.
But, the point is he didn't even try. He was not prepared to think outside the box, or at any other level than what he had been trained to believe as an upper-crust South Carolinian. He was not going to challenge the conventional wisdom of race relations in 1936 (and it's more likely than not that he agreed with it anyway). So if his role as First Captain froze out one of his own classmates, that was simply the way the world worked.
When he arrived in Vietnam - by all of Sorley's accounts a seasoned, effective division commander and WWII veteran - of course he fell back to the conventional wisdom. Since there was no specific territory to be won or lost, then of course he would fall back to the next best thing: a body count, since it was something he could measure success by. If the Korean War had taught anybody anything, it should have been that the communist forces didn't care how many bodies got stacked up, as long as they could achieve their larger goal. It was a lesson unlearned by leaders like Westmoreland.
Westmoreland was hardly the only one to blame. But when you're the leader on the ground, that's the way it goes. David Petraeus can share credit for Iraq with many people, but he's the face of the success (as of 2011 anyway).
The biography's occasional flaws are very specific information that Sorley clearly included to be comphrehensive, but it sometimes comes at the expense of context - one passage relates Westmoreland before a parachute jump; in a prior conversation with an airborne soldier Westmoreland was jaunty and confident, but when the soldier sees him before a later parachute jump, Westmoreland is nervous and quiet - the implication is that his early confident manner was a put-on. But, really, he was probably a little nervous before the jump, or who knows, maybe he was sick that day. There's no reason to pile on with little, context-free digs like that, when the historical record provides plenty of legitimate and more serious criticizm.
Sorley has provided a harsh biography of a failed leader. It's not unfair, it's well-sourced and researched to the tiniest detail.
20 of 23 found the following review helpful:
essential reading on VietnamSep 28, 2011
By Yalensian
Wars can make or break reputations, and unsuccessful wars break them, particularly of those running the show. Think Iraq and Donald Rumsfeld or Tommy Franks. Vietnam had its Robert McNamara and William Westmoreland, the subject of this new biography by Lewis Sorley. Sorley has authored some really fine works of military history, such as THUNDERBOLT, a biography of Creighton Abrams (Westmoreland's successor as head of MACV), and A BETTER WAR, an account of the war's final years when Abrams was in charge. WESTMORELAND is a fine portrait of a flawed man and offers a provocative view of Vietnam from the perspective of those leading it at the top.
William Westmoreland had a nearly impeccable resume -- and large ambitions. Born in South Carolina, he was an Eagle Scout in his youth and attended West Point, where he achieved the rank of first captain. He served in World War II and later attended Harvard Business School. In 1956, he became the army's youngest major general, and there followed an impressive string of commands: 101st Airborne Division, West Point (superintendent), and the XVIII Airborne Corps. He was then plucked to head Military Assistant Command, Vietnam (MACV), a position he held from 1964 to 1968. For all the drive and intelligence Westmoreland showed in his rise to the top, he proved remarkably, and tragically, out of his element in heading the American war effort in Vietnam. A product of World War II and the Korean War, he believed a war of attrition, relying heavily on artillery and airpower, would produce victory. It did not, of course, and despite victories in most of the large-unit battles that were fought, the North Vietnamese avoided giving that kind of battle in favor of a guerrilla war that prolonged the attrition long enough and killed enough Americans that the American public ultimately turned against the war. After Tet, Westmoreland was "promoted" to Army Chief of Staff.
Sorley is highly critical of Westmoreland -- rightly so, for the most part. This is an eye-opening account of a man unable to meet the challenges of his job, with tragic results for the men under his command and for his nation. It is also the cautionary story of how hubris causes nemesis, for individuals as well as for countries.
58 of 77 found the following review helpful:
 Battle of the memoirsOct 03, 2011
By R. W. Levesque
Although I agree with the author's statement that, "unless and until we understand William Childs Westmoreland, we will never fully understand what happened to us in Vietnam, or why," I don't believe the author achieved this goal.
There are several reasons why I believe this book does not live up to its own expectations. My first issue is Lewis Sorley's over-reliance on memoirs and oral histories in an effort to prove his points. The problem with this approach is you wind up with a "he-said-she-said" argument based on the opinions of those involved. Without context, whether these individuals supported Westmoreland or not, this comes across as a group of men finding fault after the fact.
Which leads to my second issue: lack of context and analysis. The book is a basic narrative that merely follows Westmoreland's life as if placed on a timeline. In fact, at times it comes across as a string of anecdotes, many of which seem out of place within the author's narrative. Without context or analysis you realize you're just reading data.
In fact, the first part of the book, which focuses on Westmoreland's pre-Vietnam life, could almost be dropped in its entirety. The author does not provide any insight into how his subject's life before Vietnam influenced or created the man who commanded MACV. For example, Sorley seems to make a big deal of Westmoreland's experience in Korea, but after reading through several implied "key" events, again without context, the author doesn't pull the threads together to let the reader know what impact this may, or apparently may not, have had on Westmoreland in Vietnam.
The lack of context is particularly notable because the author does not address the context of US strategy within which Westmoreland had to operate; nor does he examine the strategic situation in Southeast Asia; nor does he address the North's strategy. In other words, the book presents Westmoreland's strategy in a single dimension that does not examine the strategic factors within which he had to operate. For example, Sorley takes issue with Westmoreland's use of US forces to attack and break up enemy battalions and regiments; however an argument can be made that without destroying these elements local pacification would have been impossible (see "Grab Their Belts to Fight Them: The Viet Cong's Big-Unit War Against the U.S., 1965-1966"). It's also possible that depending on what point in time the war was being fought, and where, differing strategies were required. But none of this is addressed in presenting Westmoreland's decisions.
My third issue with the book is that, any book claiming that the Westmoreland lost the war would have to compare what he did to what he was supposed to accomplish. At no point does the author address what Westmoreland was supposed to accomplish. He makes the point that as the commander he is responsible for what his command does or fails to do, as any military commander is, but this is the easy way out.
There are also many, many other reasons why the US lost. In order to place the blame on Westmoreland, you would have to address the other issues and how they compared to what Westmoreland did, or failed to do. There were systemic issues and constraints that also caused the US to lose the war; what were they and how did they impact, or not, Westmoreland's decisions?
Unfortunately, Sorley's book presents nothing new about the war or about Westmoreland. It comes across as merely an attempt to blame Westmoreland for American's failure in Vietnam without, at any time, putting the war or Westmoreland's decisions in context. But, as has been addressed in dozens of other books, the war's loss was due to a number of other variables. In fact, before reading this book I'd recommend that you read, "On Strategy" by Harry Summers, "Dereliction of Duty" by H. R. McMaster, and "Why the North Won the Vietnam War" edited by Marc Jason Gilbert - particularly the chapter by Jeffrey Record, "How America's Own Military Performance in Vietnam Aided and Abetted the "North's" Victory," to name a few.
I'm not saying that Westmoreland was not responsible for his actions. My argument is that Sorley relies upon the opinions of others to paint a negative picture of Westmoreland, rather than providing strategic or political context, or by providing an analysis of events or decisions using more concrete sources. For example, Westmoreland's decisions to limit individual tours to one year, rely upon a war of attrition, or his failure to properly arm and train the South Vietnamese military are all presented as "wrong" decisions because others say so. But without context you can't understand the "why" he made those decisions, and without addressing what other options he had you're left merely with the argument that Westmoreland was wrong just because of popular opinion.
14 of 18 found the following review helpful:
MisleadingOct 13, 2011
By Howard C. Batt
The story Sorley tells is important and well told but misleading. Westmoreland did not "lose" the Vietnam war. First - there was nothing to "win." More important, the real problem is as Clark Clifford explains (about half way through the book) as he was taking over the defense department. Not a single person involved - not the president, not the secretary of defense, the joint chiefs or the chief of staff of the army, not Westmoreland - no one had even the beginnings of an idea what was needed to "win", what should be done or, even, how or when we would or could "win." Westmoreland was doing what every general in the history of warfare does - at least initially - he fights the last war. Westmoreland decided he could bleed the vietcong and NVA to the point they'd give up. He and all of MACV and the president and the ambassador and the chief of staff of the army, CINCPAC- everybody in charge - then proceeded to ignore anything that might show the idea the north would have to give up was wrong. The president had no clue what was going on before Tet, 1968 and then learned the situation was a disaster. Westmoreland had no real plan but neither did anyone in the Pentagon or the White House. Literally nobody knew what was going on really or if any progress was being made. There was no way to measure progress and the goal was the same as it is when a lottery ticket is bought - "I hope I win."
The shame of the book is that it is so well written and so important that it should not be titled as if some other commanding general - including Abrams who took over after Westmoreland - might have "won." We're doing exactly the same thing today with Afghanistan and Iraq. We are back to body count so we trumpet every kill by drone as yet another "victory" in "dismantling" ______________ (fill in the name of the currently targeted terrorist organization). In Vietnam it was finally recognized that viet cong and NVA casualties were being replaced easily and that the north had calculated that its losses in men were sustainable and worth it. I remember Ho Chi Minh saying "we have 200 years to win." It's no different today - probably worse - when we say we're "dismantling" a terrorist organization by hunting down "leaders" and dropping lightning bolts from the sky/. We still have no way to measure success and no real goal other than "kill the bad guys." We supposed we'd build a democratic nation in Iraq and now they not only have bled us of young people and treasure, they're turning to support Iran. We chase after Libyan rebels to help the "Arab Spring" and now missiles and other weapons are flooding into Egypt to be used against Israel and the US if we get involved. We supported Osama bin Laden with weapons and money and he became our most hated enemy.
But - is general Petraeus the hero or the future goat? It's not just him as it wasn't just Westmoreland. It's a crowd of people in important places who really don't know what they're doing but they've got a lot of firepower to do it with. It's a crowd of people who, in their zeal, forget who we are and focus on "bad guys" to the extent we give up fundamental rights and liberties to chase boogey men. It's a crowd of people who don't really understand either what they should do or what they really are doing but want to appear confidently on the trail to "success" - which, because it's of vital national importance, cannot be defined publicly.
I lost men in my command in vietnam and some very close friends. I know women who lost husbands and children who lost fathers. I know how we felt about beating the jungle down in the hopes of finding somebody to shoot. I know about spending a billion dollars a month shooting artillery shells at trail junctions and stream heads with the idea somebody might be there.I know now how stupidly arrogant our "leaders" were - including Westmoreland - although I didn't know until this book that there was any consideration of invading the north. But I also know now that Johnson and Macnamara and the rest of the crowd of arrogant generals and politicians making the decisions were all lying in the hope something good would happen to divert attention from their failures.
I wish this book was titled something like, "Arrogant Incompetence as practiced by the American Military." And I wish someday our commander in chief would find the courage to say, "General - here's what I want accomplished in the next year. Can you do it?" If he says, "no" then the choice is get another general or don't do it. Johnson finally got rid of Westmoreland - by moving him from Vietnam to become the Chief of Staff of the Army. What is it going to take currently? We've spent ten years, thousands of American lives, and a trillion dollars so far. We've got young people who suffered injuries that will require full time care for decades. We continue to spend billions of dollars on weapons to blow people up in caves in mountains most Americans have never heard of.
This book could be used as a text book for embryonic leaders. But not with the idea that "Westmoreland lost the war" and that there exist some special people who hold the secret to success. Use it to show that war is an undertaking that shares a lot with any commercial enterprise: decide what you intend to do, define that goal precisely, marshall the assets needed to achieve the goal, establish some way to measure progress and get the people together who can implement the plan. Of course there must be one person at the top. But that does not mean that the entire undertaking is dependent on that person.
It's simply not possible to say "Westmoreland lost the war" because we never had a plan to "win" it. Exactly as is happening today.
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